The Grip of History and the Scope for Novelty: Some Results and Open Questions on Path Dependence in Economic Processes by Carolina Castaldi & Giovanni Dosi
 
 
The Grip of History and the Scope for 
Novelty: 
Some Results and Open Questions on Path 
Dependence 









* LEM, Sant’Anna School for Avanced Studies - Pisa and  
ECIS, Eindhoven Center for Innovation Studies, Eindhoven, The Netherlands. 
†LEM, Sant’Anna School for Avanced Studies - Pisa  
 
2003/02  January 2004 
L LE EM M   
Laboratory of Economics and Management 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies 
Piazza Martiri della Libertà, 33 - 56127 PISA (Italy) 
Tel. +39-050-883-343  Fax +39-050-883-344 
Email: lem@sssup.it  Web Page: http://www.sssup.it/~LEM/ 
 
Working Paper Series The Grip of History and the Scope for Novelty:
Some Results and Open Questions on Path Dependence
in Economic Processes
Carolina Castaldiyz Giovanni Dosiz
1 Introduction
The very notion of multiple paths of socio-economic change ultimately rests
on the idea that history is an essential part of the interpretation of most socio-
economic phenomena one observes at any time and place. The property that
history matters is also intimately related to that of time irreversibility. In
the socio-economic domain and in many areas of natural sciences as well, one
cannot reverse the arrow of time { even in principle, let alone in practice {
and still recover invariant properties of the system under investigation. That
is, in a caricature, you may get a lot of steaks out of a cow but you cannot
get a cow out of a lot of steaks...
Such ideas of irreversibility and history-dependence are indeed quite intu-
itive and, as Paul David puts it, \would not excite such attention nor require
much explication, were it not for the extended prior investment of intellec-
tual resources in developing economics as an ahistorical system of thought"
(David (2001)).1 However, even after acknowledging that \history matters"
{ and thus also that many socio-economic phenomena are path dependent{
challenging questions still remain regarding when and in which fashions it
does. In tackling path-dependent phenomena, an intrinsic diculty rests also
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1Indeed, it is dicult to nd purely ahistorical representations even in mainstream
economics, except from some breeds of economic theory such as rational expectations or
general equilibrium theories.
1in the fact that in social sciences (as well as in biology) one generally ob-
serves only one of the many possible histories that some \initial conditions"
would have allowed. Moreover, is history-dependence shaped only by initial
conditions, however dened? Or does it relate also to irreversible eects of
particular unfolding of events? How do socio-economic structures inherited
from the past shape and constrain the set of possible evolutionary paths?
And nally, what are the factors, if any, which might de-lock socio-economic
set-ups from the grip of their past?
In this essay, partly drawing on other works by one of the authors (Dosi and
Metcalfe (1991) and Bassanini and Dosi (2001)) we discuss some of these
questions.2 In Section 2 we appraise the potential for path dependences
and their sources at dierent levels of observation and within dierent do-
mains. Section 3 presents a highly introductory overview of the dierent
modeling tools one is utilizing in order to interpret the history-dependence
of an increasing number of socio-economic phenomena. Next, in Section 4,
we highlight some results and interpretative challenges concerning some path
dependent properties of socio-economic evolution. Finally, in the concluding
section we discuss the factors underlying the tension, so to speak, between
freedom and necessity in such evolutionary processes.
2 Sources of path dependence and irreversibil-
ities
One indeed observes many potential causes for path dependence from the
micro level all the way to system dynamics. Let us review a few of them.
For our purposes here, we refer to a broad denition of path dependence as
dependence of the current realization of a socio-economic process on previous
states, up to the very initial conditions.
2.1 Irreversibilities related to the decision-making of
individual agents
Start by considering quite orthodox decision settings wherein agents hold
invariant choice sets and preferences and are endowed with the appropriate
decision algorithms. Suppose however that one of the following holds: (i)
decisions are taken sequentially over time; (ii) they reect uncertainty or
2Detailed discussions of some of the issues tackled in this essay are in Arthur (1994),
David (1988, 2001), Hodgson (2001), Freeman and Lou c~ a (2001), Witt (2003).
2imperfect information. Either of these conditions is sucient for path de-
pendence, in the sense that past decisions or past beliefs determine present
and future decision processes.3
Individual learning
More generally, a powerful driver of self-reinforcing dynamics for individual
agents or collections of them is any process of learning. If agents learn, their
behaviours depend, other things being equal, also on their memory of the
past, i.e. on initial conditions and on the history of their experience. This is
a quite general property which holds irrespectively of the purported degrees
of 'rationality' attributed to the agents themselves. So it is easily shown to
hold under Bayesian learning whereby agents update expectations on some
characteristics of the environment or on each other's features.4 More so,
path dependence applies under a wider class of learning processes whereby
agents endogenously change also their \models of the world", i.e. the very
interpretative structures through which they process information from the
environment (cf. the discussion in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996)). In all
that, path dependence goes hand in hand with irreversibility: all agents with
what they know now would not go back to yesterday's beliefs and actions
even under yesterday's circumstances.
Local interactions
In many interactive circumstances one is likely to nd that individual de-
cisions are inuenced by the decision of other agents, in ways that are not
entirely reducible to price mechanisms.5 One famous example concerns segre-
gation phenomena. Suppose that an individual moves to a certain neighbor-
hood only if at least a good proportion of his neighbors is of his same \kind"
(wealth, race, or other). If individuals are inuenced by each other's deci-
sion in this fashion, homogenous neighborhoods tend to form. Hence, very
rapidly, the housing conguration will lock into segregation of the dierent
kinds of agents.6 Similarly, another example of interdependence of prefer-
3Of course, path dependence holds, a fortiori, if preferences are themselves endogenous
(cf. the discussion in Aversi et al. (1999) and the references therein). In these circum-
stances past events irreversibly change the decision criteria agents apply even under an
invariant choice set and invariant information from the environment.
4Within the enormous literature, cf. Hahn (1987), Kreps and Spence (1985), Arthur
and Lane (1993).
5For interaction-based models cf. Brock and Durlauf (2001a), which reports a variety
of empirical examples.
6Cf. Schelling (1971).
3ences is provided by the way fashions, customs or conventions emerge. It
suces that individuals have some tendency to conform to the behaviour of
people around them for a common behaviour to spread within the population
of agents.7
2.2 Increasing returns
A quite general source of path dependence in allocation processes is associ-
ated with the presence of some form of increasing returns in production or in
the adoption of technologies and products. The basic intuition is that pro-
duction technologies (or collective preferences) in these circumstances entail
positive feedbacks of some kind.
Recall for comparison the properties of decreasing returns, say, in pro-
duction: in such a case, less input of something { for an unchanged output{
means more input of something else, and, if returns to scale are decreasing,
inputs have to rise more than proportionally with the scale of output. Con-
versely, under increasing returns, loosely speaking, \one can get more with
(proportionally) less" as a function of the scale of production or of the cumu-
lated volume of production over time. In the economists' jargon increasing
returns imply \non-convex technologies".
Non-convex production possibility sets may have dierent origins. They
may stem from sheer physical properties of production plants. For example,
in process plants output grows with the volumes of pipes, reaction equip-
ments, etc., while capital costs tend to grow with the surfaces of the latter.
Since volumes grow more than proportionally to surfaces, we have here a
source of static increasing returns. Another example, still of \static" kind,
involves indivisibilities for some inputs (for example, minimum scale plants).
The point for our purposes here is that under non-convex technologies his-
tory is generally not forgotten. The production system may take dierent
paths (or select dierent equilibria) according to its very history.
The property is indeed magnied if one explictly accounts for the role of
information/knowledge \impactedness", of untraded interdependences amongst
agents and of dynamic increasing returns.
Properties of information
The way information is distributed across dierent agents in a system, say
a market or any other environment that provides the ground for economic
7For formal models in dierent perspectives cf. Bikhachandani et al. (1992), F ollmer
(1974), Young (1998).
4interactions, together with the very properties of information, contribute to
shape the consequences of economic interactions themselves.
As the seminal works of Arrow have highlighted (cf. the overview in
Arrow (1974)) information is not an ordinary good which can be treated,
say, like a machine tool or a pair of shoes. Shoes wear out as one uses them,
while information has typically got a high up-front cost in its generation
but can be used repeatedly without decay thereafter. Moreover information
typically entails a non-rival use, in that it can be used indierently by one
or one million people. These properties entail decoupling of the costs of
generation and the benets of use of information. One could say that the
cost of production of Pythagoras' theorem was entirely born by Pythagoras
himself, while all subsequent generations beneted from it for free (except
for their eorts to build their own knowledge enabling them to understand
it).
At the same time, information (and more so knowledge8) might be ap-
propriable in the sense that other agents might have signicant obstacles to
access it, ranging from legal protections, such as patents, all the way to sheer
diculty of fully appreciating what a particular piece of information means.
This property exerts an inuence opposite to the former ones in terms of
incentives to prot-motivated investment in knowledge generation. Increas-
ing returns in use and non-rivalry may produce \under-investment" from the
point of view of social usefulness, while conditions for appropriability may
provide eective incentives for investment.9 Together, path dependent learn-
ing is inuenced by the trade-o between \exploitation" and \exploration"
(as March (1991) put it), that is between allocation of eorts to rening and
exploiting what one already knows and investment in search for new poten-
tially valuable information and knowledge (and equally important, by the
beliefs agents hold about them).
Agglomeration economies
A number of case studies have posed the question of why specic production
activities have concentrated in certain areas and not in others. The Silicon
Valley and many other local industrial districts whose history is associated
8The distinction between the two is discussed in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996): see
also the references therein.
9Incidentally note however that the latter investment might turn out of a socially
pernicious kind, trading o relatively small private rents against huge collective losses in
knowledge accumulation. The current lamentable legal arrangements on so-called Intellec-
tual Property Rights (IPR) are an excellent case to the point (a sophisticated discussion of
IPR is in Arora et al. (2001), while a more sanguine but convincing illustration is presented
in Coriat and Orsi (2002)).
5also with specic economic and technological activities, provide striking ex-
amples of \agglomeration economies". The common story starts from initial
settlements and, possibly, some favorable conditions for specic activities.
Then decisions to locate similar activities in the same region are re-inforced
via (partly) untraded interdependences supported by spatial proximity. These
may include stronger technological spillovers among producers (even when
competitors), access to specialized labour force that tends to concentrate in
the area and easier interactions with suppliers.10
2.3 Dynamic increasing returns
Technological innovation and diusion are domains frequently displaying dy-
namic increasing returns, that is non-linear and self-reinforcing processes
that occur over time.11
The process of accumulation of technological knowledge
The processes of accumulation of technological knowledge typically display
dynamic increasing returns: new knowledge cumulatively builds upon past
one, and it does so in ways whereby in many circumstances yesterday's ad-
vances make today's improvements relatively easier.12 The cumulativeness of
technological learning is enhanced by the property of knowledge { as distinct
from sheer information{ of being partly tacit, embodied in the skills, cogni-
tive frames and search heuristics of practitioners as well as in the collective
practices of organizations.13
10The wide literature includes a variety of models and explanations that also assign
dierent relevance to the initial conditions: see, among others, Arthur (1994), Krugman
(1991a) and (1996), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
11Cf. Dosi (1988) for a detailed discussion of the properties of technological knowledge.
12This is not to say of course that some forms of \decreasing returns" never endanger
knowledge accumulation. Intuition suggests immediately a few historical cases where
technological opportunities appear to progressively shrink. However, at a closer look,
what generally happens is that increasing returns may well tend to dry out, but one is
still a long way from decreasing returns setting in (that is, more formally, one is basically
talking about the properties of second derivatives). This applies even in the case of all
those resource-based activities such as agriculture and mining which have been for more
than two centuries the menacing reference of the mainstream in the economic discipline.
13A partly overlapping idea is that learning is typically local, in the sense that what
agents learn tends to be \near" what agents already know: cf. the pioneering models
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and David (1975) and within the subsequent literature,
Antonelli (1995), among others. All this admittedly involves a highly metaphorical notion
of \nearness", since we still fall short of any robust topology, or anything resembling it,
in the space of knowledge.
6Moreover, as one of us argues elsewhere (Dosi (1982)), technological
innovations are often shaped and constrained by particular technological
paradigms and proceed along equally specic technological trajectories. In
all that, initial conditions| including the economic and institutional factors
inuencing the selection amongst alternative would-be paradigms|, as well
as possibly small seemingly \random" events, aect which trajectories are
actually explored. It is a story that one reconstructs at length in Dosi (1984)
in the particular instantiation of silicon-based microelectronics, but it ap-
pears in dierent variants across diverse technologies.
Finally, throughout the whole process of establishment of new paradigms
and the more incremental patterns of innovation thereafter, the emergence
of networks of producers, suppliers, etc. together with other organizations
(universities, technical societies, etc.) institutionalizes and so to speak 'so-
lidies' specic paths of technological learning.
The adoption of technology
Somewhat symmetrically, on the demand side of technological change, i.e.
on the side of consumers and technology-users, a wide theoretical and em-
pirical literature has emphasized the relevance of positive feedbacks: for the
seminal explorations of the choice problem among alternative products that
embody competing technologies, cf. Arthur (1994) and David (1985). Dy-
namic increasing returns and externalities appear to be at the core of the
explanation of why the pool of users/consumers may select technologically
inferior standards simply because that technology was the rst to be cho-
sen. Indeed, interpretations such as the foregoing ones place a good deal
of path dependence weight, together with initial conditions, on \historical
accidents" i.e. more formally on small initial stochastic uctuations that
happen to determine the nal outcome for the system. The story of the
QWERTY typewriter keyboard is a famous one (David (1985)). The key-
board was introduced in 1868. Alternative, more ecient, keyboards were
brought to the market later, but did not succeed in replacing the initial one:
QWERTY remained the dominant standard due to the 'lock-in' induced by
the complementarity between installed base and specicities in the skills of
the users.14 Many other examples can be found when it comes to so-called
\network technologies" for which the issue of compatibility among the dier-
14The QWERTY story reports on initial events that may constrain long term outcomes.
In a dierent example, David (1992) vividly reports about the individual role played by
Thomas Edison in the early battle to win dominance in electricity supply market and
discusses in general the power of intentionality in determining historical paths. See also
the discussion in Section 5.
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Figure 1: The Fujiyama single-peaked tness landscape.
ent components of the system is a crucial one (a discussion of some examples
is in Bassanini and Dosi (2001)).
2.4 Properties of selection
Selection processes among heterogenous entities, both at the biological and
economic levels, are another important source of path dependence. In the
economic arena, selection occurs in multiple domains, concerning e.g. prod-
ucts (and indirectly rms) on product markets; rms, directly, on nancial
markets; technologies, indirectly through the foregoing processes and directly
via the social dynamics of inter-technology competition.15 In fact selection
processes may entail multiplicity of outcomes for the system16 if dierent
traits (or maybe, genes, in biology) { i.e. idiosyncratic characteristics of the
composing entities of any agent {, contribute in interrelated ways to the t-
ness (in biological terms) or to the competitiveness (in economic terms) of
agents. This happens for example when there are complementarities between
specic characteristics.
One way to represent the relationship between traits and tness is in
15One of the formal representations of such competitive processes is through so-called
replicator dynamics: cf. Metcalfe (1998), Silverberg (1988), Young (1998), Weibull (1995),
and the pioneering Winter (1971) (we oer a basic intuition in the Appendix).
16Using the terminology that will be more formally dened in the next section we can
dene this property in terms of \multiplicity of equilibria".
8Fitness
Figure 2: A tness landscape with several local maxima peaks (Schwefel's
function) .
terms of tness landscapes.
When the tness contribution of every trait or gene is independent, the
tness landscape looks like a so-called Fujiyama single-peaked landscape (see
Figure 1). Under the assumptions that higher tness corresponds to evolu-
tionary advantage in the selection process and that the biological or economic
agents adapt in a xed environment, then the system converges to the sin-
gle maximum peak whatever the rule of adaptation and whatever the initial
condition.17
However, as soon as the tness contributions of some traits depend on the
contributions of other traits, i.e. epistatic correlations appear, then the t-
ness landscape becomes rugged and multi-peaked. In this case the initial
positions in the landscape and the adaptation rules that underly the move-
ment of individual entities in the landscape together determine which (local)
peaks are going to be attained by the system.18
17Even in this case, things might not be so simple. For example, the irrelevance-of-
initial-conditions property may well turn out to rest on very demanding assumptions,
including the presence of the 'best' combination of traits from the very start and its sur-
vival throughout the ('disequilibrium') process of adaptation/selection. For an insightful
discussion cf. Winter (1975).
18A general introduction to 'rugged landscape' formalizations is in Kauman (1989).
92.5 The nature of corporate organizations
Organizations typically compete on a rugged landscape because of comple-
mentarities in the organizational components that contribute to their \t-
ness" (or \competitiveness"). Adaptation over rugged competitive land-
scapes may often yield lock-ins into dierent tness peaks. And, indeed,
interrelated technological and behavioural traits are likely to be a primary
cause of the path dependent reproduction of organizational arrangements
(Marengo (1996), Levinthal (2000)).
More generally, an interpretatively challenging view of economic organiza-
tions (in primis business rms) depicts them as history-shaped behavioural
entities, carriers of both specic problem-solving knowledge and of specic
coordination arrangements amongst multiple organizational members hold-
ing (potentially) conicting interests.
Individual organizations carry specic ways of solving problems which are
often hard to replicate also because they have a strong tacit and partly col-
lective component. Organizational knowledge is stored to a signicant extent
in the organization's routines19, that is in the operating procedures and rules
that rms enact while handling their problem-solving tasks. Relatedly, the
accumulation of technological and organizational knowledge is, to a good de-
gree, idiosyncratic and cumulative.
Business organizations may be viewed as entities which imperfectly evolve
mutually consistent norms of incentive-compatible behaviours and learning
patterns.
Together, (i) the complexity (and non stationarity) of the environments in
which rms operate; (ii) multiple 'epistatic correlations' amongst behavioural
and technological traits; and (iii) signicant lags between organizational ac-
tions and environmental performance-revealing feedbacks, all contribute to
render utterly opaque the link between what rms do and the ways they are
selectively rewarded in the markets where they operate. After all, 'epistatic
correlations' on the problem-solving side blur straightforward attributions of
blames and credits (\...was it the R&D department that delivered the wrong
template in the rst place, or did the production department mess it up along
the way?..."). And so do far less than perfect spectacles interpreting envi-
ronmental signals (\...are we selling a lot, notwithstanding some temporary
fall in protability, precisely because we are on the winning track, or just
because we badly forgot the relation between prices and costs...?"). In these
circumstances path dependence is likely to be fueled by both behavioural
('procedural') and 'cognitive' forms of inertia.
19Cf. Nelson and Winter (1982), Cohen et al. (1996), Coriat and Dosi (1998a), Dosi,
Nelson and Winter (2000), among others.
10This is also another aspect of the fundamental \exploitation/exploration"
dilemma mentioned above. Within uncertain, ill-understood, changing en-
vironments, reasonably favorable environmental feedbacks are likely to re-
inforce the reproduction of incumbent organizational arrangements and be-
haviours, irrespectively of whether they are notionally \optimal" or not.
2.6 Institutions
In fact these latter properties are part of a more general point which ap-
plies to many other formal organizations, in addition to business rms { e.g.
public agencies, trade unions, etc. { and to many institutional arrangements
including ethical codes, 'habits of thoughts', etc.20 As argued by David
(1994), institutions are one of the fundamental carriers of history. They
carry history in several ways. First, they carry and inertially reproduce the
architectural birth-marks of their origin and tend to persist even beyond the
point when the conditions which originally justied their existence, if any,
cease to be there. Second, they generally contribute to structure the context
wherein the processes of socialization and learning of the agents and their in-
teractions take place. In this sense, one could say that institutions contribute
to shape the very tness landscapes for individual economic actors and their
change over time. Third, at least as important, they tend to reproduce the
collective perceptions and expectations, even when their mappings into the
\true" landscapes are fuzzy at best. At the same time, fourth, institutions
also represent social technologies of coordination: as argued by Nelson and
Sampat (2001), they are a source of (path dependent) opportunities for social
learning.
In brief, institutions bring to bear the whole constraining weight of past
history upon the possible scope of discretionary behaviours of individual
agents, and relatedly, contribute to determine the set of possible worlds which
collective dynamics attain, given the current structure of any socio-economic
system.
Such path-dependent properties are indeed magnied by the widespread
complementarities amongst dierent institutions which make up the socio-
economic fabric of particular countries: cf. the evidence and interpretations
put forward from dierent angles, including \institutionalist" political econ-
omy (Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), Hall and Soskice (2001), Streeck and
Yamamura (2001)), game-theoretic inspired institutional comparisons (Aoki
(2001)) and historical institutionalism (North (1990)). A thorough discus-
20More detailed discussions of the nature of \institutions" by one of us are in Dosi (1995)
and Coriat and Dosi (1998b).
11sion of political institutions is in Pierson (2000) who has recently argued
that politics is characterized by a prevalence of specic (\political") versions
of increasing returns. The major roots are traced, among others, in the
collective nature of politics (making for the political equivalent of network
externalities), in the complexity of political institutions and in the possibility
of using political authority to enhance asymmetries of power. All this, to-
gether with the usually short time horizon of political actors and the inertia
of political institutions, makes the cost of reversing a specic course of events
particularly high, and thus tends to induce widespread lock-in phenomena.
To repeat, complementarities generally induce \rugged" selection land-
scapes. So, at this level of analysis, there is no unequivocal measure of any
particular mode of organization of e.g. labour markets or nancial markets
or State/business rm relations...
Revealed performances depend on the degrees of complementarity between
them. But the other side of the same coin is the frequent presence of \lo-
cal maxima" in the admittedly rather metaphorical space of institutional
arrangements where countries path-dependently converge.
Take an example among many and consider the institutional arrange-
ments governing national systems of innovation and production. A recent
literature has rather convincingly argued that they are major ingredients in
shaping growth patterns of dierent countries and their specialization in in-
ternational trade (Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Archibugi et al. (1999)).
Moreover, an enormous literature, involving sociology, political science and
the political economy of growth, has powerfully emphasized the inertial and
self-sustained reproduction of institutions and organizational forms as deter-
minants of specic growth patterns of dierent nations, showing variegated
patterns of \catching up, falling behind and forging ahead".21 Still, political
and institutional lock-ins are almost never complete, and what appeared to
be \stable equilibria" for a long period, may be quickly disrupted by a se-
quence of strongly self-reinforcing, possibly surprising, events. So, even when
looking at growth performances across countries, recent history has shown
the rise of new (sometimes unlikely) actors in the international economic
scene as well as the decline of seemingly unlikely others.
Indeed, secular comparisons between the fates of e.g. the UK, Germany,
and the USA; Russia and Japan; Argentina and Korea; etc., entail ma-
jor challenges to the analysts irrespectively of their theoretical inclinations.
So, for example, while there is hardly any evidence on long-term conver-
gence patterns in e.g. technological capabilities, labour productivities, per
21For some stylized facts, cf. Abramovitz (1986), Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994) and
Meliciani (2001), among others.
12capita incomes, etc., equally, there is no easy story on the \drivers of conver-
gence/divergence" that may be mindlessly applied across dierent countries.
\History" { both economic and institutional {, in our view, most likely mat-
ters a lot. But it does so in ways that certainly go well beyond any naive
"initial condition" hypothesis. For example, Korea in the late 40's had ed-
ucational levels, (population-normalized) capital stock, etc., comparable to
the poorest countries in the world and certainly of orders of magnitude worse
than Argentina, but also of India. Given that, what are the dierences in the
socio-economic processes and in their forms of institutional embeddedness, if
any, which account for such striking dierences in revealed performances?
2.7 From micro behaviours to system dynamics, and
back
In this section we have tried to ag out a few of the very many likely sources
of history- (or, equivalently, in our jargon here, path-) dependence. Some
of them straightforwardly pertain to the dynamics of individual agents and,
more metaphorically, individual organizations. Conversely, other properties
have to do with system dynamics, i.e. they concern some properties of the
dynamics of collections of interacting agents.
The relationship between the two levels of observation however turns out
to be a tricky one. Admittedly, economists still do not know a great deal
about all that. Two relatively robust properties appear however to stand
out.
First, system dynamics is generally shaped by the characteristics, be-
liefs, expectations of micro actors, even when such beliefs are evidently at
odds with any reasonable account of the environment wherein agents oper-
ate. Hence, there is often ample room for \self-fullling" expectations and
behaviours, obviously entailing multiple expectation-driven equilibria or dy-
namic paths. A good case to the point is the wide literature on \sunspot
equilibria".22 The punchline is the following. Suppose some agents in the
system hold the view that some \weird" variables (e.g. sunspots or, for that
matter, patterns in beauty contest winners or football scores, etc.) bear last-
ing inuences on economic dynamics. What will happen to the dynamics of
the system itself? The answer (obviously overlooking here a lot of nuances) is
that the dynamics, or analogously, the equilibrium selection will most often
depend upon the distribution of beliefs themselves, no matter how \crazy"
they are.
22The original reference is Cass and Shell (1983); for a recent survey cf. Benhabib and
Farmer (1999).
13A second robust result concerns aggregation and the general lack of iso-
morphism between micro- and system-level behaviours. So, for example,
distributions of stationary (\routinized") micro rules may well engender an
apparently history-dependent dynamics as a sheer result of statistical aggre-
gation over a multiplicity of agents (Forni and Lippi (1997)). In a similar vein,
seemingly \well behaved" relations among aggregate variables { e.g between
prices and quantities { are shown to be the outcome of sheer aggregation
over heterogenous, budget-constrained, agents (Hildenbrand (1994)).
For our purposes here, these latter properties imply also that one may con-
ceive dierent combinations between \exible", reversible, micro behaviours
and powerful system-level path dependences, and vice versa (one proposes a
taxonomy in Dosi and Metcalfe (1991)).
Last but not least, note that one ought to account for the importance
of macro-foundations of micro behaviours. Collective norms, institutions,
shared habits of thoughts, etc. have a paramount importance in shaping
micro \mental models", preferences and behavioural patterns: in that, all
history frozen in incumbent institutions exerts its self-reproducing eects.
3 Theoretical representations of path depen-
dent processes
In the history of the economic discipline one nds lucid early accounts of path
dependent increasing returns. Adam Smith's story on the \pin factory" is a
famous one. In brief, the eciency of pin production grows with the division
of labour, the degrees of mechanization of production and the development
of specialized machinery, which in turn depend on the extent of the market,
which in turn grows with production eciency....
Indeed throughout the last two centuries a few seminal contributions have
addressed positive feedback processes in knowledge accumulation and eco-
nomic growth.23 (Recall also that, as already noted, increasing returns are
not necessary for the occurrence of path dependence.24) Nonetheless, it is
fair to say that increasing returns and path dependence have been stub-
bornly marginalized by the mainstream of economic theory for reasons that
is impossible to discuss here.25 At the same time, a facilitating condition for
23Outstanding examples include A. Young, N. Kaldor and G. Myrdal. See the discussion
in Arthur (1994), chapter 1.
24Cf. the thorough discussions in David (1988, 1993, 2001). Moreover, in Bassanini
and Dosi (2001) one shows that under certain conditions increasing returns are neither
sucient for path dependence (see also below, Section 5).
25On dierent facets of the epistemology of a paradigm which, for a long time, has
14such a lamentable state of aairs has been for long time the lack of formal
instruments accounting for path dependent processes. However, things have
recently changed in this latter respect.
3.1 Formal tools
A set of powerful formal results in mathematical modeling tools has pro-
vided new ways of representing both non-linear deterministic dynamics and
stochastic ones. Let us provide here a brief, very simple, overview of some
helpful formal tools.
Nonlinear dynamics and chaos
Suppose one can represent system dynamics through a transition function f
that determines the value of the variable at time t+1 in relation to its value
at time t:
xt+1 = f(xt) (1)
Dene a steady state as a point x for which x = f(x), i.e. a point where
the system settles. If the transition function is linear, there exists only one
steady state (whether stable or unstable). Multiplicity of steady states oc-
curs as soon as the transition function presents non linearities (an example
is shown in Figure 3). In a deterministic setting, the steady state to which
the system will eventually converge is going to be determined solely by initial
conditions. An important property of this system is its full predictability.
Given the initial condition and the transition function, one in principle knows
the nal state to which the system will get and also the exact path followed
to reach it.
The growing understanding of the properties of non-linear dynamic systems
has brought new insights and tools of analysis.26 Moreover, as widely shown
in elds like physics, chemistry and molecular biology, non-linear processes
can result in \self-organization" of systems as a far-from-equilibrium prop-
erty. Highly complex behaviours can arise even with very simple transition
functions, the best known example being the logistic function. Such systems
however may be highly sensitive to small disturbances in initial conditions
and display a multiplicity of patterns in their long-term behaviour. Arbitrar-
ily small initial dierences can result in cumulatively increasing dierences
stubbornly focused on the properties of history-independent equilibria, cf. Freeman and
Lou c~ a (2001), Hodgson (2001) and Nau and Schefold (2002).
26Cf. Brock and Malliaris (1989), Haken (1981), Prigogine (1980), Prigogine and








Figure 3: A non-linear transition function that implies multiple steady states.
Stable and unstable steady states are indicated with S and U, respectively.
in the historical trajectories via self-reinforcing dynamics. The best known
examples are chaotic dynamics.
A denition of chaos rests on the sensitive dependence of the underlying dy-
namical systems on initial conditions, in the sense that arbitrarily small dif-
ferences lead to increasingly divergent paths in the system dynamics. Hence,
chaotic patterns are those whereby the path of the dynamical system is fully
unpredictable in the long term, yet with a characteristic structure that dier-
entiates it from a purely casual behaviour and allows short term predictabil-
ity.
Stochastic processes
A distinct potential source of path dependence in the dynamics relates to
the impact of ex-ante unpredictable shocks occurring throughout the process.
The property is captured by various types of stochastic models, possibly with
time-dependence or state-dependence of probability distributions of shocks
themselves.27
David (2001) provides two complementary denitions of path dependent pro-
27A good deal of the formal tools can already be found in classics such as Feller (1971)
and Cox and Miller (1965). However their economic application (with some signicant
renements) is a more recent phenomenon.
16cesses, namely:
\A negative denition: Processes that are non-ergodic, and thus
unable to shake free of their history, are said to yield path depen-
dent outcomes.
... A positive denition: A path dependent stochastic process
is one whose asymptotic distribution evolves as a consequence
(function of) the process' own history." (David (2001))
The key concept here is that of ergodicity. Intuitively, a process is ergodic
if in the limit its underlying distribution is not aected by events happened
\along the way" (we provide a more formal denition in the Appendix). This
means that in the long run, initial history does not aect the likelihood of
the dierent possible states in which the system may end up. The opposite
applies to non-ergodicity.
In the theory of stochastic processes, Markov processes provide a sort of
benchmark for analysis. In a canonic Markov process the \transition proba-
bilities" that dene the dynamics of the system depend only on the current
state of the system, regardless of the whole history of previously visited
states. Think of the simple case of a \random walk", which can be thought
to describe the motion of a particle along a line. The particle can either
jump up or down, with respective probabilities p and q. These transition
probabilities characterize the motion from t to t + 1 and only look at one
time step, irrespectively to the previous positions occupied by the particle.28
Conversely, history of previous events is relevant in non-Markovian processes,
which have been exploited to model path-dependent economic phenomena.
We provide two illustrative examples that also relate to previously discussed
sources of path dependence.
The rst example concerns Polya urn processes.29 Arthur et al. (1983) have
utilized them to model increasing returns in adoption of alternative technolo-
gies when the incentive to adopt each technology depends on the number of
previous adopters. The setting involves an urn containing balls of dierent
colors. Basically, one can think of dierent colors as alternative technologies.
Each agent draws a ball and then inserts a ball of the same color back in
the urn. Then every time that a technology is chosen, the probability that
the same technology is chosen at the next time step increases. One can then
prove that under rather general conditions the limit state of the system is
the dominance of one of the technologies. Being the limit state an absorbing
28An important feature is however worth mentioning: even for the simplest random
walk the state at time t embodies the full memory of all shocks which drove it from its
very beginning.
29See the appendix for some formal denitions and results.
17one, this formally denes a process of lock-in in one technological monopoly.
The second example is provided by the so-called voter model.30 The model
entails random local interactions between agents in a nite population. The
basic idea is that agents vote depending on the voting frequencies of their
\neighbours". In one and two dimensional spaces, it can be proved that the
system clusters into an homogenous setting where agents all vote for the same
party. Local positive feedbacks represent the key for explaining locking in
this irreversible state. At the same time, initial conditions and the particular
unfolding of micro-choices determine which of the states is attained within
any one \history" (David (2001) discusses the socio-economic importance of
the model).
4 Understanding path dependence in economic
evolution: some results and challenges
The foregoing examples of formal modeling of path dependent economic pro-
cesses ought to be taken as promising even if still rather rudimentary at-
tempts to grasp some fundamental properties of economic dynamics. They
certainly fall short of any thorough account of socio-economic evolution (com-
pare for example the 'grand' evolutionary research program as outlined in
Dosi and Winter (2002) which in turn builds upon the seminal Nelson and
Winter (1982)). However, they already oer precious insights, and together,
interesting interpretative puzzles.
4.1 Degrees of history dependence and their detection
David (2001) oers the following categorization of the degree of \historicity",
i.e. of the strength of the inuence of the past in economic dynamics:
\weak history goes so far as to recognize \time's arrow" (the
rooted sense of dierence between past and present)...;
moderate to mild history acknowledges that instantaneous tran-
sitions between discrete states have high and possibly innite
adjustment costs, so that it would take time and a sequence of
motions to attain a terminal state (family size, capital stock, rep-
utation, educational or skill level){ whence we have the notion of
a dynamic path being an object of choice;
strong history recognizes that some dynamical systems satisfy
30For details, cf. the original model Holley and Liggett (1975) and Liggett (1999).
18the conditions for path dependence of outcomes, or of transition
probabilities and asymptotic distributions of outcomes. " (David
(2001), italics added)
Within the broad class of processes displaying some forms of history depen-
dence, how much does history actually matter? Which one of the foregoing
'degrees of historicity' apply to which phenomena?
In order to address such questions, a major methodological issue imme-
diately springs up. Social scientists (to repeat, as well as biologists) most
often observe just one historical path. When very lucky, evolutionary biolo-
gists neatly catch { as Darwin was able to do { just some independent (on
biological scales, rather short) branches of the same evolutionary process. So-
cial scientists nd it even harder to observe and compare alternative sample
paths. Hence, how can one be sure that what one seemingly detects in the
actual history was not the only feasible path given the system constraints?
For sure, anthropologists have a rich comparative evidence, but it is very
hard to bring it to bear on the issues of path dependence discussed here. A
comparatively more modest, albeit still daunting, task concerns the analysis
of technological and institutional dynamics within the domain of modern,
mostly 'capitalist', history. Have they been the only feasible paths given
the system constraints? Or, conversely, can one think of other dynamics {
notionally feasible on the grounds of initial conditions { whose exploration
has been ruled out by any actual sequence of events?
Even more specically, why have historically observed technologies been
chosen? Were they \intrinsically" better in ways increasingly transparent
to the involved actors? Or, conversely, did they become dominant as a re-
sult of multiple (mistake ridden) micro decisions, piecemeal adjustments,
co-emergence of institutional structures, etc. { irrespectively of the presence
of notionally \superior", relatively unexplored activities? (Of course similar
questions apply to the emergence and persistence of particular institutions,
forms of corporate organizations, etc.)
Competing answers to this type of questions and competing methodolo-
gies of investigation clearly fold together.
At one extreme, a style of interpretation focuses on the nal outcome of
whatever process, and { when faced with notional, seemingly \better" alter-
natives { it tries to evaluate the \remediability" of the status quo. Under high
or prohibitive remediation costs and in absence of striking \irrationalities"
along the past decisions history, one next declares the absence of path de-
pendence. This extreme view tries to justify and explain any end-state of the
system as being the best possible outcome given the (perceived) constraints
by imperfectly informed but fully 'rational' agents along the whole path. The
19view, emphatically illustrated in Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) and (1995)31
basically aims at rationalizing whatever one observes as an equilibrium and,
at the same time, at attributing rational purposefulness to all actions which
led to any present state.
On all that, David (2001) and Dosi (1997) coincide in the skepticism about
any Panglossian interpretations of history as \the best which could have
happened", mainly \proved" by the argument that \rational agents" would
not have allowed anything short of the optimal to happen (compared with
Voltaire's Candide on the virtues of Divine Providence).
Conversely, a distinct perspective rather bravely tries to face the challenge
of counter-factuals (\...what would have happened if..."): hence it focuses on
the actual thread of events, on the possible amplication mechanisms linking
them, and together, on the (varying) potential leverage that individuals and
collective actors retain of inuencing selection amongst future evolutionary
paths.
A good part of such exercises is inevitably \qualitative", based on case stud-
ies, circumstantial comparisons across rms and countries displaying dierent
evolutionary patterns, etc.32 However, complementary investigations address
some path dependent properties on more quantitative grounds, concerning,
e.g. real and nancial time series.
A complementary task: detecting non-linearities
Early examples of statistical tools devised for detecting forms of path depen-
dence are those trying to detect chaos. While chaos can be easily obtained
out of economic models, not much supporting evidence has been collected so
far. Limitedly to high-frequency nancial time series, there is some evidence
of chaotic behaviour,33 but there is hardly evidence for other economic se-
ries.34 Brock et al. (1991) formally test for chaos in a number of economic
and nancial datasets. This is done by applying the \BDS" test, presented
in Brock et al. (1996) in order to detect low-dimensional chaos. At the same
time, as Brock (1993) himself critically discusses \...chaos is a very special
species of nonlinearity..."; so that it is misleading \...to conclude that weak
evidence for chaos implies weak evidence for non linearity." (p.7).
Moreover, note that the apparent linearity/predictability/lack of path depen-
31For critical assessment see David (2001) and Dosi (1997).
32An interesting exercise, involving a few respected historians is Cowley (1999).
33For a survey of the literature on chaos in macroeconomics and nance see LeBaron
(1994), and previously Kelsey (1988).
34A more optimistic view on the pertenance of chaotic dynamics for economic phenom-
ena is in Chen (1993, 2003).
20dence on some time scale does not rule out \deeper", possibly \slower" path
dependent dynamics. So, for example, under conditions resembling what in
biology are called \punctuated equilibria"(Elredge and Gould (1972)) phase
transitions between apparent steady states might occur infrequently, rather
abruptly, unpredictably triggered by particular chains of events,35 while pos-
sibly still leaving linear structures of the time series in the (quasi) equilibrium
phases.
4.2 Path dependence in economic evolution
Granted all that, how do such dierent degrees of path dependence show up
in the 'grand' evolutionary interpretation of economic change? The latter,
as outlined in much greater detail in Coriat and Dosi (1998a) and Dosi and
Winter (2002), entails at the very least as fundamental building blocks:
(i) heterogenous, 'boundedly rational' but innovative agents;
(ii) increasing returns in knowledge accumulation;
(iii) collective selection mechanisms, including of course market interac-
tions;
(iv) multiple forms of social embeddedness of the processes of adaptation,
learning and selection.
The late S. Gould has reminded us (originally addressing evolution in the
biological domain) that an illuminating angle to interpret evolutionary dy-
namics is by trying to identify what would remain unchanged if \the tape of
evolution would be run twice" (Gould (1977)).
It is indeed a very challenging question for social scientists too.
Needless to say, \running the tape" all over again most likely would change
the identities of who is \winning" or \losing"; who survives and who does
not; who is getting at the top and who is getting at the bottom of the social
ladder. However, this should not come as such a big surprise. After all, it
is much more plausible to think of system-level path-independent or path-
dependent equilibria, irrespectively of individual destinies.
Hence, what about system-level dynamics? One must sadly admit that evo-
lutionary arguments have too often been used as ex post rationalizations of
whatever observed phenomena: again, the general belief is that \explaining
35An insightful germane discussion, building on the 'long waves' debate on economic
growth' is in Freeman and Lou c~ a (2001).
21why something exists" has too often meant showing why in some appropri-
ately dened space \whatever exists is a maximum of something" and this is
the reason why it inevitably exists...
Quite a few applications of \evolutionary games" to both economics and bi-
ology are dangerously near such an interpretative archetype. And so is a
good deal of 'socio-biology' (a bit more of a discussion by one of us in Dosi
and Winter (2002)). Admittedly, even relatively sophisticated evolutionary
interpretations of economic change tend to overlook the possible history de-
pendence of specic evolutionary paths.
Conversely, a few (mostly qualitative) analyses { already mentioned above {
of the properties of national systems of production and innovation and of the
\political economy" of growth powerfully hint at underlying path dependen-
cies. And the conjecture is indirectly corroborated by several formal results,
from dierent theoretical elds. They include, as already mentioned, path
dependent selection amongst alternative institutional arrangements (Aoki
(2001)), models of selection amongst alternative technologies, and also path
dependencies in the statistical properties of growth processes of stylized in-
dustries and economies { even under unchanged initial conditions { (cf. Win-
ter et al. (2000) and Dosi and Fagiolo (1998)).
Certainly, most of the work of exploration of the possible properties of his-
tory dependence in incumbent models of economic evolution still awaits to be
done. At the same time, an equally urgent task regards the development of
broader interpretative frameworks explicitly addressing hierarchically nested
evolutionary processes, allowing for e.g. (on average, slowly changing) in-
stitutions which in turn structure (on average, faster) dynamics of social
adaptation, technological explorations, etc.. (A fascinating template of such
an exercise concerning biology is presented in Fontana (2003), this volume.)
4.3 Selected histories might be quite 'bad': the painful
acknowledgment of the distinction between inter-
pretative and normative analyses.
\Evolution" as such, both in the biological and socio-economic domains, does
generally involve at least \weak to mild" history dependence { in the forego-
ing denitions {. However, a much trickier question regards the properties of
those very evolutionary processes as judged against any normative yardsticks.
Does \evolution" entail some notion of \progress" in some appropriately de-
ned space?
As already mentioned, the general notion of history dependence of any socio-
economic process is in principle quite separate from any normative evaluation
22of the \social quality", however dened, of the outcomes which history hap-
pens to choose. As David (2001) argues in detail, one may think of quite a
few circumstances easily involving multiple neutral equilibria or paths which
turn out to be (roughly) equivalent in normative terms. On formal grounds,
the original Polya urn example is a good case to the point. The whole set of
reals on the interval [0;1] happens to be xed points satisfying the condition
f(x) = x, where x may stand for frequencies of e.g. technologies, behaviours,
strategies, organizational forms, etc. and f(x) for the probabilities of their
social adoption, without any distinct normative feature attached to them.
Further suggestive examples come from biology hinting at the widespread
occurrence of neutral drifts in the genotypical space mapping into diverse
but tness-equivalent phenotypical structures.
At the same time, it equally holds that many path-dependent processes do
entail the possibility of lock-in into equilibria or paths which are \domi-
nated" in normative terms (i.e. intuitively are \socially worse"), as com-
pared to other notional \better" ones which could have been explored given
some initial conditions but ultimately turn out to be unreachable under rea-
sonable switching costs at later times36 (the argument is forcefully presented
in Arthur (1994)). In this respect, a few analyses have focused so far upon
rather simple cases of choices amongst technologies and social conventions,
often highlighting the path dependent properties of the underlying selection
processes. However, the relevance of path dependent selection of relatively
\bad" institutional set-ups and technologies remains a highly controversial
question. One inclination is to depart from any naive notion of evolutionary
dynamics leading { notwithstanding painful detours and setbacks { \from
worse to better". In many respects such a \progressive" view is shared by a
whole spectrum of scholars, ranging from Karl Marx to contemporary neo-
classical economists.37 Empirically, as Nelson (2002) has recently suggested,
it may well be that \physical technologies" tend to often display more \hill-
climbing" features as compared to \social" technologies, due to our relatively
higher ability in the former domain to test hypotheses and codify solutions to
the problems at hand. So, for example, while e.g. electricity or antibiotics or
vaccines happened to be rather uncontroversial technological advancements,
one seldom nds crisp matching examples in the social domain.
Come as it may, history is full of cases of collective dynamics irreversibly
36Formally, one can show that asymptotic switching costs may well be innite, under
dynamic increasing returns even from an \inferior" to a (notionally) \superior" technol-
ogy/organizational form, etc.
37Indeed, many economists, even among the most sophisticated ones, are inclined to
read history as a painstaking process driving { notwithstanding major setbacks { toward
market (\capitalist") economies: see for example Hicks (1969).
23leading from better to worse: in our view, the story of Easter Island vividly
depicted in Diamond (1995), far from being an odd outlier, is indeed an
archetype of common processes of transitions to worse and worse coordina-
tion equilibria. The decadence of many civilizations probably belongs to that
same class of collective dynamics: institutions and microbehaviours coevolve
in ways such as to yield recurrent transitions to \worse and worse" social
arrangements.
5 Locking and de-locking: some conclusions
on the tension between freedom and neces-
sity
It follows from our foregoing discussion that two somewhat complementary
mechanisms are always at work. On the one hand, specic histories of
competence-building, expectation formation, emergence of particular orga-
nizational structures, etc. together yield relatively unique and hence het-
erogenous micro histories.
On the other hand, broader mechanisms of alignment of individual and orga-
nizational decisions, together with convergence to dominant technologies and
institutions, tend to reduce such a diversity among agents and bring about
relative consistency of behaviours, practices, expectations.
More precisely, mechanisms at the heart of aggregate \coherence" include:
(i) social adaptation by individual actors; (ii) the path-dependent reproduc-
tion of a multiplicity of institutions governing interactions amongst agents;
(iii) selection mechanisms (comprising of course market-selection dynamics).
These processes contribute to explain locking into specic \socio-economic
paths". But lock-ins seldom have an absolute nature: the unfolding of his-
tory while closing more or less irremediably opportunities that were available
but not seized at some past time is also a source of new \windows of oppor-
tunities" { using again Paul David's terminology { which allow de-locking
and escaping from the past.
Let us outline some of the forces that work as potential factors of \de-
locking".
First, a straightforward mechanism of \de-locking" is related to invasions.
They can be literal ones as it has often happened with past civilizations, and
also more metaphorical ones, i.e. the \contamination" with and diusion
of organizational forms, cultural traits, etc. originally developed elsewhere.
Sticking just to organizational examples, think of e.g. the worldwide \inva-
sion" of Tayloristic principles of work organization { originally developed in
24the US, or more recently the diusion of \Japanese" management practices.
Second, social adaptation is never complete, at least in modern societies.
However, precisely the gap between social norms and prescribed roles, on the
one hand, and expectations, \mental models", identities which agents actu-
ally hold, on the other, may be an extremely powerful source of \unlocking"
dynamics: within an enormous literature, see the fascinating comparative
analysis of the riots of obedience and revolt by B.Moore (1978), and also,
from the economists' camp, the formal explorations of some implications
of \cognitive dissonance" including Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Kuran
(1987, 1991). Third, and relatedly, non-average (\deviant") behaviours may
well entail, under certain circumstances, what natural scientists call \symme-
try breaking" and phase transitions to dierent collective structures (Allen
(1988)).
More generally, fourth, a fundamental role in preventing irreversible socio-
economic lock-ins is played by various forms of heterogeneity among agents
{ in terms of e.g. technological competences, behavioural repertoires, strate-
gies, preferences, etc. {.38
Fifth, \de-locking" possibilities might be a byproduct of those very mecha-
nisms which tend to induce path dependence in the rst place. Indeed many
organizational forms, behavioural patterns, etc. tend to be selected over mul-
tiple selection domains, possibly characterized by diverse selection criteria.
So, for example, as one argues in Coriat and Dosi (1998a), organizational
routines entail possibly uneasy compromises between their problem-solving
ecacy and their properties in terms of governance of conicting interests.
Complementarity of functions, as discussed above, is likely to induce multi-
plicity of equilibria and path dependence. However, such equilibria may well
be \meta-stable", entailing the possibility of de-locking induced by increased
inadequacies in some of the aected domains (i.e. over some \selection land-
scapes"). A good case to the point is the increasing mismatching between
formal hierarchies, incentives and actual decision powers driving toward the
collapse of centrally-planned economies (Chavance (1995)).
Finally, sixth, a major de-locking force has historically been the emergence
of radical technological innovations, new knowledge bases, new sources of
technological opportunities (i.e. what one calls in Dosi (1982), new techno-
38In fact heterogeneity of agents can help also in explaining why \locking" might not
occur: instead one might observe market sharing of dierent technologies or organizational
forms. As shown in Bassanini (1999) and Bassanini and Dosi (2003), convergence to
monopoly of a technology, an organizational form, etc. may in fact not occur even under
conditions of increasing returns if the degree of heterogeneity of agents is high enough.
Similarly Herrendorf et al. (2000) prove that heterogeneity of agents is a condition for
avoiding multiple or indeterminate equilibria in GE models.
25logical paradigms): on the powers of `Unbound Prometheus' of technological
change cf. the seminal works of Landes (1969), Freeman (1982) and Rosen-
berg (1976). Ultimately, as we have tried to argue in this essay, human aairs
always involve a tension between the tyranny of our collective past and the
apparent discretionality of our wills. Admittedly, one is still rather far from
getting any robust understanding even of the basic mechanisms underlying
this tension. However, it is a fundamental exercise if one wants to handle
the uncountable problems of collective action we continously face and try to
(imperfectly) shake free of the grip of the past and shape our future.
26Appendix
Ergodicity in stochastic processes
Take the family of Markov processes as baseline reference for the stochastic
processes of interest here. Given the set of possible states in which the system
may nd itself, one is in general interested in the probability distribution over
the states, possibly dierent at dierent points in time. For (time invariant)
Markov processes:
Pr(Xt = yjXt 1 = x;:::;X0 = x0) = Pr(Xt = yjXt 1 = x) = px;y (2)
i.e. the probability of being in state x at time t conditional on all states
visited in the past reduces to the probability conditional only on the state
visited in the previous time t   1. The probability px;y is called the transi-
tion probability from state x to state y39 and together with the distribution
on the initial states, fully determines the joint (unconditional) probability
distribution over the set of possible states. Moreover, one can partition the
set of all possible states into transient and recurrent states depending on the
probability that the stochastic process returns to the states after a rst visit.
A stochastic process is ergodic if one can obtain a probability distribution
over the recurrent states that in the limit does not depend on the initial state
of the system.
Non-Markovian processes do not satisfy condition (2), implying that the
whole path of previously visited states is relevant in determining the proba-
bility of nding the process in a specic state at any given time.
Polya urn processes
Assume an urn of innite capacity containing balls of two colors, say, white
and black. At every draw a number c of balls of the same color as the
drawn ball is added to the urn. (In the generalized urn scheme there are
k dierent ball colors.) If c is greater or equal to one, the process entails
positive feedbacks: if a color is drawn once, then the likelihood of drawing
that same color at the next time step is higher. If c = 0 the process reduces
to independent Bernoullian draws, when c is negative the process accounts
for negative feedbacks. It can be proved that when c  1 such a process
converges with probability one to the dominance of one single color of the
39Here we take the transition probability to be time-invariant. One could generalize to
time-dependent probabilities.
27balls. This limit state is absorbing, meaning a zero probability of leaving it.40
In the case of an urn with two colors, let Xt be the proportion of white balls
in the urn at time t. Consider the case when one ball is added into the urn
at time steps t = 1;2;:::. The probability that the new ball is white is a
function of the share Xt, say ft(Xt), where ft : [0;1] ! [0;1]. The new ball
is then black with probability 1   ft(Xt).
One can then represent the dynamics of Xt as
Xt+1 = Xt +
t(Xt) Xt
t+n with t  1 and X1 = nw
n (3)
where nw is the proportion of white balls at the initial time and t are inde-
pendent random variables with binary outcome dened by
t(Xt) =

1 with prob ft(Xt)
0 with prob 1   ft(Xt) (4)
ft(Xt) represents the average of t(Xt). Call  t(Xt) = t   ft(Xt) the dier-
ence between t(Xt) and its mathematical expectation, so that E[ t(Xt)] = 0.
The we can rewrite Eq. 3 as
Xt+1 = Xt +
[ft(Xt) Xt]+ t(Xt)
t+n (t  1)
Under this formulation the realization of the process at time t + 1 is given
by the realization at time t plus a term with two components. The rst
component, ft(Xt)   Xt, is a systematic one, the second component is the
zero-mean noise  t(Xt). Then the limit points of the sequence Xt have to
belong to an appropriately dened set of zeros of the function ft(x)   x for
x 2 [0;1].
The outlined case is indeed the most general one, without conditions on the
continuity of the f function. For discussions and formal proofs of the limit
results see Arthur et al. (1983), Dosi and Kaniovski (1994), Hill et al. (1980).
Replicator dynamics
Evolutionary theory developed in biology rests on two main elements: (i)
perpetual generation of novelty; (ii) selection of 'superior' species, given het-
erogenous populations.
The original mathematical representation of the selection mechanism via the
so-called replicator dynamics, is through the Fisher equation (more on eco-
nomic applications in Metcalfe (1998)). Assume the existence of n types of
40For an overview of the state-of-the-art in generalized urn schemes and hints on their
economic applications, cf. Dosi and Kaniovski (1994).
28entities in the population. Call xi the fraction of the population of type i
and call Fi its tness. Then the Fisher equation in the linear continuous
simplication reads:
_ xi = cxi[Fi    F]





The way such simple version of the replicator dynamics operates is such that
the relative frequency of types with higher-than-average tness grows, while
the proportion of types characterized by below average tness shrinks. If the
tness measure is constant over time the system is bound to converge to the
dominance of the ttest type. More general formulations allow for non linear
interactions amongst traits which contribute to overall tness and for changes
of tness landscapes themselves (cf. Silverberg (1988) for a discussion of
various selection models).
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